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Abstract 
 
Modern international relations are established on the 
acceptance of international law as the rules of conduct. But how 
does this legal order, which originated from European 
jurisprudence, acquire its universality? How did this legal order, 
in the time of European colonial expansion, interact with other 
systems of law, which formed the sociopolitical foundation of 
the non-Western powers, such as China? These are the two main 
problems being addressed by this study, which focuses on the 
translation of Western writings, particularly those by American 
jurist Henry Wheaton, and legal documents on international law 
in China from the late 19th century. This article, which takes a 
legal comparative perspective, argues the clashes between China 
and European colonial powers by nature were disputes between 
the jurisdictions. The clashes reflect the realpolitik struggles 
between two powers, as well as the limitation of 19th-century 
international law based on the acceptance of a Eurocentric 
universalism.  
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1.  Introduction 
By the end of the 19th century, the world had witnessed a 
wave of legal reforms in the non-Western world, and those 
reforms resulted in the positivist transformation of state 
sovereignties. This globalisation of European legal principles 
was accompanied by colonial expansion. As John Gallagher 
points out, this colonial expansion goes beyond a simple form of 
territorial domination and becomes the ‘imperialism of free 
trade’.1 Safeguarding lucrative trade routes, hence, became the 
priority of diplomacy, both in and outside Europe. To regulate 
the commercial and diplomatic activities in Europe, 
international law was generally received as a protocol, 
especially after the 1815 Vienna Congress.2 To some scholars, 
this practice of using the law to regulate international conduct 
conveyed a Western jurisprudence, which expanded to the non-
Western world through colonialism. Turan Kayaoğlu refers to 
the dominance of the Western legal episteme, developed 
through European colonial expansion, as ‘legal imperialism’.3 
This process was accompanied by a systematic discrimination 
against the ‘savage’ legal systems of the colonised, which led to 
the ‘transfer of laws and legal institutions from one society to 
another’.4  
To China, this process appeared to be complex. 
Contemporary Chinese historiography denotes Chinese society 
during the late Qing Dynasty (1840-1911) as ‘semi-colonial’.5 
In addition to being political rhetoric, this term reflects the 
historical reality of the Chinese encounter of foreign 
imperialism. Despite the absence of an institutional colonial 
                                                          
1 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," The Economic History 
Review, New Series 6, no. 1 (1953). 1–15. 
2 Rune Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China, Translation, Reception 
and Discourse, 1847-1911 (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 45.  
3 See Turan Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman 
Empire, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 13.  
4 Sally Engle Merry, "Review: Law and Colonialism," Law & Society Review 25, no. 4 (1991). 889–
922.  
5  This concept of ‘semi-colonial state’ derives from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s famous analysis of 
imperialism. V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in Lenin Selected Works 
(Moscow, USSR: Progress Publishers, 1970). 702. 
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order in China, the Chinese encounter with foreign imperialism 
still shatters its self-perception of being the ‘Middle Kingdom’ 
in the traditional Confucian ‘tianxia’ (literally means 
‘everything under the heaven’) world view.6 There were three 
main channels that consolidated the political reality for such a 
legal transformation. First, there was the signing of bilateral or 
multilateral treaties between the Qing Empire and the Euro-
American powers. Second, there was the Chinese translation of 
Euro-American legal and political writings. The third channel 
involved Chinese reformist intellectuals, especially those who 
studied law and related subjects abroad. 
The Western colonial presence in China during the 19th 
century constituted the political environment that called for an 
‘active struggle’, both intellectually and politically, to cope with 
the changing world order.7 During the late 19th century, Chinese 
intellectuals and royal officials began to discuss the possibility 
of ‘bianfa’ (literally means ‘change law’). The process of bianfa 
involved a political attempt to transform state legislation by 
following the principles that constituted modern Western 
sovereign states. It also called for educational and military 
reforms, which eventually contributed to China’s revolutionary 
transition from a Confucian empire to a modern republic.  
Academic interpretations of this process have largely 
focused on the emergence of the prevailing influence of Western 
international law as a universal knowledge that challenged, and 
eventually replaced, non-Western languages of universalism. 8  
How did the pragmatic diplomatic practices of the West lead to 
Chinese recognition of 19th century European sovereignty? 
How did Western international law, as a ‘positive morality’, 
pave the way for the positivist transformation of Chinese law? 
                                                          
6 John K. Fairbank, ed. The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). 2–5.  
7 Immanuel C. Y.  Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 6 ed. (New York: OUP USA, 2000). 14.  
8 Lydia Liu, "Legislating the Universal: The Circulation of International Law in the Nineteenth 
Century," in Tokens of Exchange, ed. Lydia Liu (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). 1–12. Also 
see Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China, Translation, Reception and 
Discourse, 1847–1911, 1–19 and 69–70. 
 5  
 
How should we interpret the internal transformation and 
development of Chinese jurisprudence under the influence of 
Western pragmatic diplomacy, and under the idealistic 
interpretation of Western international law by American 
missionaries? 
This paper examines the Chinese translations and 
interpretations of Western international law between 1839 and 
1895. The systematic translation of modern international law, 
under American influence, began in China in the 1860s. William 
Alexander Parsons Martin, an American Presbyterian 
missionary to China, translated Henry Wheaton’s Elements of 
International Law (hereafter EIL) into Chinese under the title 
Wanguo Gongfa (萬國公法  Public Law for Ten Thousand 
Nations, hereafter WGGF). As this paper shows, through 
Martin’s translations and interpretations, Western international 
law appeared to be based on strong natural legal characteristics 
rather than the fruit of 19th-century European legal positivism. In 
Martin’s reading, natural law affirms the universality of 
Christianity. By discussing the ‘analogous rules’ of the Zhou 
Dynasty that dealt with divided nations, Martin correlated 
Confucius’ concept of Chunqiu Gongfa (春秋公法 Public law in 
Spring and Autumn Period) with the European idea of natural 
law, which focused more on the moral rationale and principles 
behind the rule of law. Martin translated the term ‘Natural Law’ 
as ‘xingfa’ (性法 literally means law of human nature).9 This 
ecumenist attempt appeared to be broadly accepted by Chinese 
reformists, such as Kang Youwei, Zheng Guanying, Chen Chi 
and Liang Qichao. However, as this paper argues, Chinese 
intellectuals’ gongfa thinking transcended Martin’s  
(mis)interpretation of international law. By mobilising 
traditional Confucian knowledge, they attempted to constitute a 
Confucian universality that narrated the changing world order. 
                                                          
9 Henry Wheaton, Wanguo Gongfa, trans. W.A.P. Martin (Beijing: Jingdu Chongshiguan, 1864).  Also 
Xuezhong Lin, Cong Wanguo Gongfa Dao Gongfa Waijiao: Wanqing Guojifa De Chuanru, Quanshi 
Yu Yingyong (from Public International Law to International Diplomacy: The Introduction, 
Interpretation and Application of International Law in Late Qing Period) (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji 
Press, 2009). 220–30.  
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The reinterpretations of Chunqiu Gongfa by intellectuals, who 
studied abroad or served as diplomats, such as Zeng Jize, Ma 
Jianzhong and Xue Fucheng, were similar to legal positivism.  
This work uses universality to highlight the underlining 
tendency of legal episteme, which intends to systematically map 
and regulate the world. A key subject within the legal episteme 
analysed in this paper is jurisprudence. This paper 
acknowledges the plurality of jurisprudence in the 19th century, 
and it examines the intensive struggles among them, namely 
legal positivism, natural law, and Chinese ‘gongfa’ thinking. 
Such conflicts were represented through diplomatic clashes and 
intellectual debates. These clashes and debates created a rich 
context, through which we could decipher the 19th-century Euro-
American legal discourse, and through which we could 
understand its hegemonic impact toward the non-Christian 
world in general. 
2.  The Contradictory Encounter of International Law in 
19th-century China 
To China, the ‘tianxia’ world view was a discourse on 
universalism regulating its international and domestic activities 
for a long time. In the Chinese ‘tianxia’ world view, the 
differentiation between ‘hua’ (civilised) and ‘yi’ (barbarian) was 
crucial to regulating relations, both within and outside the 
China’s political and cultural domain. In Confucian tradition, 
the two concepts must not be considered as simple identification 
of ethnicity, but rather recognition of cultural differences. This 
relationship reveals the importance of employing customary 
tradition when interacting with the ‘yi’, and in providing ‘yi’ 
with the possibility of cultivation, so they can transform into 
‘hua’. Both customary norms (li) and codified rules (fa) 
constitute coherent Chinese traditional law. In Confucian 
tradition, ‘li’ connotes the virtue of propriety. ‘Li’ and ‘ren’ 
(benevolence) are the pillars of Confucius’ social order.10 The 
                                                          
10 Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, "China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase 1858-
1880," (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). 111.  
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formality of li was socially bounded.11 Hence, it provides space 
for accommodating foreign customs without jeopardising the 
coherence of Confucius’ universality.  
Historical cases indicate China’s imperial legal system 
appeared to have the flexibility of incorporating foreign customs 
and adjusting Chinese law to accommodate subjects from a non-
Confucian background.12 The concept of international law was 
first considered to be a ‘barbarian technique (yiji)’ that was 
practical for dealing with subjects who were unfamiliar with 
Confucian jurisprudence. Jesuit missionaries were considered 
the conduit in between. 13  Principle of European international 
law was first practised during the negotiations between the Qing 
and Russian empires that resulted in the signing of the Treaty of 
Nerchinsk (1689). The treaty was considered an ‘unusual one’, 
as the Jus Gentium was observed in both the negotiation and 
ratification processes with an intensive involvement of Thomas 
Pereira. 14  
However, the absence of such confidence appeared after 
China’s traumatic defeat in the realpolitik struggle in the 19th 
century. Subsequently, a growing number of Chinese reformist 
and revolutionary intellectuals began to share an essential urge 
to join the ‘family of nations’, and to regain ‘sovereign rights’. 
They proposed various approaches to achieve this goal. To 
conduct legal reformation, or to reform the nation via 
constituting the new ‘national citizen’ (xinmin), or through 
revolutionary liberation of people, they demonstrated their 
ambition to constitute the modern Chinese citizenship.15 As a 
phenomenon, the Qing empire was irreversibly constituted into 
a ‘universal’ language of diplomacy, politics, and equality, 
                                                          
11 Tung-Tsu Chu, Law and Society in Traditional China (Westport, Conn: Hyperion Press, 1979). 278-
9.  
12 Ermin Wang, Wukou Tongshang Bianju (the Changing Situation of Treaty Ports System) (Guilin: 
Guangxi Normal University Press, 2006). 91-104. 
13 Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China, Translation, Reception and 
Discourse, 1847-1911. 38. 
14 Joseph Sebes, The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689): The Diary of Thomas 
Pereira, S. J. (Rome: Institutum Historicum S. I., 1962). 
15 Zhongjiang Wang, Jindai Zhongguo Siweimoshi Yanbian De Qushi (the Trend of the Evolution of 
Modern Chinese Intellectual Paradigm) (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Press, 2008). 82-176, and 371-81.  
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which was enforced via military conquest and consolidated by 
multilateral treaties.16 However, greater scholarly attention must 
be focused on the complexity of intellectual and political 
struggles behind the formation of such a modern ‘universality’.  
As the balance of power shifted among European nations, 
and as British colonial expansion increased in China during the 
19th century, European international law evolved into a general 
rule of conduct that challenged the legality of the Chinese 
tianxia world view. Both the Treaty of Nanking (1842) and the 
Treaty of Tien-Tsin between the Queen of Great Britain and the 
Emperor of China (1858, hereafter the Treaty of Tien-Tsin) 
contained articles that specified the equality of formality in 
diplomatic conduct. The latter treaty also imposed the famous 
legal injunction against China’s Qing government by using the 
word ‘yi’ to describe the British in official documents.  
To pragmatic European diplomats and jurists in the 19th 
century, European international law applied only to the 
Christian world.17 This conveniently justified the exception of 
the non-Western/Christian world as subjects of international law. 
In the context of 19th-century realpolitik struggles, Christian 
universalism became a pragmatic standard, which defined norms 
and expelled abnormalities. While conflicts in Europe shaped 
the general rules for international interactions (especially wars) 
among European states, expansion in the non-European world 
posed a new challenge.18 Hence, it was best not to apply this 
‘code of chivalry’ while interacting with the ‘semi-civilised’ or 
‘uncivilised’ world. For example, when making a formal 
declaration of war prior to commencement of hostilities, this 
code of conduct was often breached when one of the belligerents 
was a ‘semi-civilised nation’.19 Under such an attitude, Martin’s 
                                                          
16  James L. Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
17 Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law trans. Michael Byers, Illustrated, revised ed. 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000). 464. Also Alexander Orakhelashvili, "The Idea of European 
International Law," Eur J Int Law 17, no. 2 (2006). 315-47. 
18 Theodore J. Grayson, "The War in the Orient in the Light of International Law," The American Law 
Register (1898-1907) 53, no. 11 (1905). 672-97. 
19 Ibid. 
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translation of international law was loathed by some European 
diplomats. M. Klecskowsky, then-French chargé d’affaires, 
criticised ‘this man who is going to give the Chinese an insight 
into our European international law’, and he suggested ‘this man’ 
should be choked off.20  
Such exceptionism also worked to exempt European 
citizens from being subjects of Chinese law. The first Opium 
War (1840-42) marked the beginning of ongoing trade-related 
conflicts between China and Western nations. In the case of the 
opium trade, British justification for waging war against China 
was not over the morally questionable issue of protecting the 
opium trade, but over the ‘methods used by Chinese officials’ to 
treat the ‘British subjects’. According to Lord Palmerston’s 
letter to Emperor Daoguang, the war was intended to rescue 
British merchants in China from the ‘barbarous fate which 
awaited them’. 21  Discrediting the Chinese legal system as 
‘barbarous’ paved the way for the installation of British consular 
jurisdiction in China, which was ratified in the Treaty of the 
Bogue in 1843. By manufacturing opposition against ‘barbarous’ 
China, European nations’ practice of political and ideological 
expansion in China could still be justified under the rhetoric of 
carrying out a ‘civilising mission’. 22  The convenience of 
operating outside the sanction of Chinese law intrigued other 
nations with a presence in China, and it was soon requested by 
the US (1844), France (1844), and later Japan (1871).  
However, to the Christian missionaries, especially a 
Presbyterian missionary like W.A.P. Martin, Christian 
universality reflected an evangelical message, which would 
eventually enlighten each person on earth.23 ‘Civilisation’ was 
                                                          
20 W. A. P. Martin, A Cycle of Cathy, or China, South and North with Personal Reminiscences, 3 ed. 
(New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1900). 234.  
21 Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 3 vols., vol. 1 (New York: 
Paragon Book Gallery, 1900). 624. A detailed discussion of the British attitude towards the opium 
trade, please see Glenn Melancon, "Honour in Opium? The British Declaration of War on China, 
1839–1840," The International History Review 21, no. 4 21, no. 4 (1 December 1999). 855-74. 
22  Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 32-144. 
23 For detail discussions on W.A.P. Martin’s Presbyterian theology, please refer to Ralph Covell, W. A. 
P. Martin: Pioneer of Progress in China (Washington D.C.: Christian University Press, 1978). 8-21. 
 10  
 
considered a developed stage of human enlightenment. Early 
Jesuit missionaries were even willing to make compare equally 
Confucian moral doctrines and Christian teachings when 
preaching. In many cases, the ability to cite Confucian classics 
to support their arguments proved beneficial when they 
introduced Christianity to Chinese intellectuals and officials.24 
In practice, Martin treated Confucius’ nine classics as 
collections of ‘moral teachings’, which were antiquities that 
conveyed universal values. In his reading, the Four Books, a 
collection of four Confucian canons composed after Confucius, 
were the ‘New Testament of China’, but with a legal 
significance to Chinese society that resembled the role of the 
Talmud in Judaism.25 
Martin’s interpretation of modern Western international 
law emphasises moral universality. However, the political 
reality in 19th-century China posed a serious challenge to his 
interpretation of the law. On the one hand, European states were 
reluctant to abide by international law outside the ‘Christian 
world’, as they considered the newly formed principles as overly 
restrictive. Their practice of realpolitik in China appeared to be 
in line with the thriving trend of legal positivism among 19th-
century Western jurists.26  
On the other hand, Christian missionaries, in their legal 
translations, advocated international law as a form of universal 
morality, which was applicable across the globe without 
prejudice. Both Martin and John Fryer tended to advocate the 
European natural law tradition, which was deemed to be similar 
to traditional Chinese Confucian morality. Through their 
translations, concepts such as  ‘equality’ and ‘right’ were 
introduced to Chinese in a natural law context. During the 19th 
                                                          
24 Liam Matthew Brockey, Journey to the East: The Jesuit Mission to China, 1579-1724 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press, 2008). 187. For the detailed discussions on Christian missionary works in China, 
especially their methods and social impacts, please refer to John K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History 
of China, vol. 10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 543-90. 
25 Martin, A Cycle of Cathy, or China, South and North with Personal Reminiscences.. 59-60. 
26 Nico Krisch, "International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the 
International Legal Order," The European Journal of International Law 16, no. 3 (2005). 369-408. 
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century, China’s political encounters with such concepts were 
through intercourse with Western hegemonic powers, which 
largely operated on the basis of realpolitik. It was in this 
paradoxical context that the history of China’s reception of 
modern international law unfolded.  
3. The Struggle between Two Systems of Jurisprudence: A 
Discursive Analysis  
A. ‘Tianli’ and ‘Renqing’: Chinese Jurisprudence  
The first attempt to translate Western international law in 
China was a practical choice. In 1839, Lin Zexu, the 
commissioner in Canton, wrote an official letter to Queen 
Victoria.27 Although Lin’s use of international legal concepts 
was no more than a utilitarian attempt to solve the opium 
problem in China, the attempt revealed, at least for some 
officials, there was a need to use the Western method to conduct 
international interactions. In his letter, Lin cited Emerich de 
Vattel’s Le droit des gens (1758), which had been recommended 
to Lin by Peter Parker, an American diplomat. Parker and Yuan 
Dehui were commissioned for the translation. Eventually, four 
articles that focused on the rights to confiscate smuggled goods 
were translated. These four articles appear in Wei Yuan’s 
Haiguo Tuzhi, which was published in 1847.28 
Intertextuality exists between the Chinese translation of de 
Vattel’s work and Lin’s letter to Queen Victoria. In his letter, 
Lin began his argument by stating two ‘universally 
acknowledged principles’, namely ‘whatever is beneficial to 
tianxia (the world), [the Chinese emperor] will publicise it (与
天下公之 ). Whatever is harmful, [He] will eliminate it for 
tianxia (为天下去之)’. On behalf of ‘the Heart of Heaven and 
Earth’, the Emperor could carry out such jus cogens norms with 
                                                          
27 SSu-Yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West, a Documentary Survey 
1839-1923 (New York: Atheneum, 1971). 24-8. 
28 Yuan Wei, Haiguo Tuzhi, ed. Zongtang Zuo, 24 vols., vol. 21 (Pingqing1876). 
 12  
 
‘equal benevolence’. 29  To Lin, the universality of Chinese 
jurisprudence came from the common moral ground of mankind. 
He argues the opium trade ‘rouses indignation in every human 
heart, and is utterly inexcusable in the eyes of celestial reason’.30 
The phrase ‘every human heart’ is used to translate the Chinese 
term ‘renqing (人情 )’; while ‘celestial reason’ is used to 
translate ‘tianli (天理)’. The two concepts were consolidated to 
become the foundation of statutes that reflected Chinese 
jurisprudence during the Ming and Qing dynasties. 31  The 
preamble of the Great Qing Code (大清律例 Ta Tsing Leu Lee) 
revised in 1740, emphasises the codification of Qing statutes 
was based on the spirit of ‘tianli’ and ‘renqing’, so every part of 
the Great Qing Code is arranged to ensure ‘universal application’ 
and ‘justice’.32 In Sir George Staunton’s translation, ‘tianli’ and 
‘renqing’ were referred to as ‘heavenly principles’ and ‘human 
sentiment’ respectively.  
The different translations of these terms reveal an 
intriguing divergence in European legal narratives. The previous 
Christian missionaries’ narrative eliminates the legal essence of 
the Chinese terms, and presents them in line with Christian 
universality. Such representation makes Lin’s work appear to be 
a moral argument with no legal substance. However, to 
European legal philosophers, especially after the emergence of 
the natural law tradition, the formalist law requires the 
presentation of legal logic from the principle of protecting 
individual rights.33 The justice and fairness of the legal system is 
therefore understood, as natural law jurists argue, from an 
                                                          
29 English translation of this letter appears in Chinese Repository. ‘Letter to the Queen of England, 
from the High Imperial Commissioner Lin, and His Colleagues,’ Chinese Repository VIII, no. 10 
(February 1840). Its original draft in Chinese can be found in Zexu Lin, Lin Zexu Ji : Gong Du 
(Collection of Lin Zexu's Works: Offical Correspondences) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1963). 125-7. 
The English translation here was by myself. 
30  Zhiguang Fang and Yanfa Zhou, eds., Linshi Jiacang Lin Zexu Shi Yuan Liangguang Zougao 
(Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1988). 90. 
31 Li Chen, ‘Law and Sensibility of Empire in the Making of Modern China, 1750-1900,’ in UMI 
Microform (New York: Columbia University, 2009). And Yonglin Jiang, The Mandate of Heaven and 
the Great Ming Code (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2011). 
32 Tao Tian and Qin Zheng, eds., Daqing Lüli (the Great Qing Code) (Beijing: Law Press, 1998). 4-5.  
33 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, trans. Ephraim Fischoff, 4 
ed., 2 vols., vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 657. 
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individual basis. Equality is based on the recognition of 
individual rights, while the right to self-preservation and the 
right to property are recognised as two fundamental human 
rights. Therefore, 19th-century European colonial expansion 
toward ‘uncivilised’ territory, and the spirit of ‘power balance’ 
within European countries, could be rationalised in the logic of 
the natural law system.  
One of the main issues Lin intended to defend was the 
importance of aliens (waiyi 外夷) in China respecting Chinese 
law. According to the Qing code, foreigners living in China 
were subject to Chinese (Qing) law. To the Qing government, 
with the exception of serious criminal offences that were 
punishable by death, mediation was the general approach to 
dealing with cases that involved foreigners. 34  That approach 
reflected jurisprudence during the Qing Dynasty, and it 
represented the legal embodiment of Confucius’ ethical norms.35 
A typical jurist opinion regarding the practice of this principle 
appeared in a report by Commissioner Ruan Yuan. Ruan once 
reported to the royal court about the handling of a murder case 
that involved several British sailors on board the Topaze. He 
reckoned the British soldiers committed crime in in-land shall 
be considered as criminal offences involving aliens. The case 
shall be trailed in China according to Chinese law.36 
 
 
 At that time, most of the incidents involving foreigners 
were dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Officials in charge 
                                                          
34 George Staunton also noticed that Chinese officers tended not to enforce Chinese law upon the 
foreigners who lived in their jurisdictions. Ta Tsing Leu Lee, trans. George T. Staunton (London 1810), 
36n. Also Philip C. C. Huang, "Court Mediation in China, Past and Present," Modern China 32, no. 3 
(2006). R. Randle Edwards, "Ch'ing Legal Jurisdiction over Foreigners," in Essays on China's Legal 
Tradition, ed. Jerome Alan Cohen, R. Randle Edwards, and Fu-mei Chang Chen (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980). And Jingfan Zhang, ed. Qingchao Fazhishi (Legal History of the Qing Empire) 
(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1998). 548-83. 
35 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1973). 5. 
36 Edwards, "Ch'ing Legal Jurisdiction over Foreigners.".  
 14  
 
often noted, in their rulings and royal reports, that the 
judgements were strictly based on the spirit of Chinese 
jurisprudence accommodating both tianli and renqing. In 1839, 
Qing issued a decree, which made opium smuggling as a crime 
punishable by death. According to this newly announced rule, 
the primary offender of opium smuggling, foreign or Chinese, 
faced the death penalty by decapitation while the accomplice 
would receive death penalty by hanging, in accordance. Lin, 
who was trying to inform the British government about the new 
regulation, followed China’s legal tradition of mediation, and he 
claimed the British offenders had shown remorse, therefore they 
could be exempted from the death penalty.37 This reveals the 
general spirit of the Qing government’s legal system when 
dealing with foreigners.  
 
B.  ‘Gongfa’ from Missionaries’ Perspective 
Missionaries’ legal translations appeared to propagate the 
inclusiveness of Christian universalism by emphasising the 
natural law characteristic of international law. Civilisation 
becomes a moral principle, rather than a legal concept, and that 
suggests there is a limitation to the applicability of international 
law. Such a demonstration of Christian universality disguises 
the colonial tendency in the natural law tradition after Grotius. It 
also omits the 19th-century legal positivists’ acknowledgement 
of international law being a law of will and consent. The 
idealistic approach to understanding international law sets the 
tone for the Chinese reception of international law in the late 
19th century. It also establishes the intellectual context for the 
Chinese reception of Western political concepts, such as the 
individual and their rights.  
Four years after the signing of the Treaty of Tien-Tsin, in 
1862, under the recommendation of Anson Burlingame and 
Robert Hart, Martin, then an interpreter for the U.S. Envoy 
                                                          
37 Fang and Zhou, Linshi Jiacang Lin Zexu Shi Yuan Liangguang Zougao. 90 and 93. 
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Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China, William B. 
Reed, began to translate Wheaton’s work in Shanghai with the 
assistance of four Chinese Christians, He Shimeng, Li Dawen, 
Zhang Wei and Cao Jingrong.38  In 1864, Martin was called to 
Beijing. With the support of Prince Gong, he worked with Chen 
Qin, Li Changhua, Fang Junshi and Mao Hongtu. The 
translation was soon used as a textbook to train Chinese 
diplomats. Martin was appointed chief instructor and president 
of Tung Wen College in 1869. With the help of his Chinese 
colleagues, Martin also translated Theodore Dwight Woolsey’s 
Introduction to the Study of International Law (first English 
version published in 1860, Chinese version published in 1878), 
Johann Kaspar Bluntschli’s Das Moderne Völkerrecht der 
Civilisieten Staten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt (German version 
published in 1868, Chinese version in 1879) 39  and William 
Edward Hall’s Treatise on International Law (English version 
published in 1880, Chinese version in 1903). Martin’s 
translation of EIL provided the Chinese equivalents for Western 
legal concepts such as sovereignty (zhuquan), right (quan), 
nation and state (guo). The Chinese words ‘manyi’ and ‘jiaohua’, 
in this translation, were used as equivalents of ‘barbarian’ and 
‘civilized’.  
Wheaton’s work appears to be influenced by natural law 
tradition. He recognised the importance of self-preservation in 
international conduct, and he agreed that law of nations was 
‘nothing but the law of nature applied to nations’. Wheaton 
shares another concern with the natural law theorists. To 
Wheaton and Grotius, only by acquiring sovereignty can a state 
be considered in the scope of international law, and regarded as 
a participant in the modern world order. Being a civilised nation 
is the foundation for becoming a sovereign nation. The basis of 
human civilisation comes from the unity of Christendom. 
Therefore, he recognises the domination of the making of 
international law by Christian countries, as well as their 
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obligations to spread this fruit to contribute to the promotion of 
the progress of civilisation.40 Such arguments are in line with 
Grotius. 
Despite the natural law influence, Wheaton’s main 
approach is more positivistic. He argues the earlier attempts to 
deduce international law from a theory were rather unrealistic. 
He notes the traditional theories of international law assume an 
independent nation will work for international advantages. 
Wheaton intends to produce a practical international law. He 
attempts to depict the rights and obligations of a sovereign state, 
and to construct the state as a subject of international law, to 
solve the problems in international interactions. 
Wheaton suggests that natural law fails to provide any 
form of higher sanction. It remains as ‘the law of God’. To 
Wheaton, consent from civilised nations is a more reliable 
sanction compared with the ‘higher sanction’ from the divine. 
Therefore, he builds his work on the ‘intercourse of States, the 
discussion and decision’ from ‘all civilised nations profess to be 
bound in their mutual intercourse’. He also uses ‘sources of 
information in the diplomatic correspondence and judicial 
decisions’ from the USA. 41  
However, the complexity in Wheaton’s work, especially 
his connection with and deviation against 17th-century European 
natural law tradition, was eliminated from Martin’s translation. 
Martin’s interest was in seeing international law as ‘the mature 
fruit of Christian civilisation’. It was a reflection of God’s law, 
which could be ‘inscribed on the human heart’. Martin’s 
argument was a natural theology, and he used international law 
as a form of secular knowledge to argue for the universality of 
Christian moral norms.42 He hoped by using international law he 
could correspond to the Chinese tradition, and then pave an easy 
way to demonstrate Christian universality. Martin 
                                                          
40 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, (ed.) Richard Henry Dana Jr., 6 (ed.) (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1866). 13, 32, and cxc–cxci.  
41 EIL, 14, cxcv–cxcvi, and cxcii–cxciii.  
42 Covell, W. A. P. Martin: Pioneer of Progress in China. 149, and 110-25.  
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acknowledged the analogous concept of principles to regulate 
‘peace and war’ had already come into existence during the 
Zhou Dynasty in China.43  
Martin’s intension could also be discerned through the 
omitted texts in his translation. The first chapter of Wheaton’s 
work was a theoretical discussion in which he stated his 
positivistic view. However, Martin systematically pretermitted 
this legal discussion and the resulting case studies. Also, none of 
Wheaton’s prefaces to the sixth edition were translated. To 
Martin, the natural law tradition appeared to be more appealing 
and easier to accept. For example, in Chapter 1, Section 6, 
Wheaton discussed Cornelius van Bynkershoek’s work. 
Wheaton argued van Bynkershoek, despite writing in the age of 
natural law, managed to conceive the importance of practice in 
the consolidation of the law of nations. According to Wheaton, 
van Bynkershoek believed the law of nations derived from 
‘reason and usage (ex ratione et usu)’.44 Martin used the Chinese 
legal term ‘li (例)’ to translate ‘usu’.45  In the Chinese legal 
structure, ‘li’ functions almost as precedent in the common law 
system. 46  As supplements for lü ( 律 ) (code), li is an 
accumulation of previous legal cases. It is legally binding, and it 
provides a reference for subsequent trials of a similar nature. 
However, ‘usu’ suggests a very important positivistic 
perspective of the law of nations. It suggests the ‘practice’ of all 
the nations, which cannot be considered as legal precedent, 
since there is no code in existence. Wheaton elaborates on van 
Bynkershoek’s argument that ‘the law of nations is only a 
presumption founded upon usage, and every such presumption 
ceases the moment the will of the party who is affected by it is 
expressed to the contrary’.47 This crucial section showcases the 
classic 19th-century legal positivism, which believes the sanction 
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46 Regarding the definition of ‘li’ in the Chinese legal system, please refer to Gao Chao et al., (eds), 
Zhongguo Gudai Faxue Cidian (Tianjin: Nankai University Press,1989). 200. 
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in international law is purely based on the collective will of the 
sovereigns. Without the ‘usu’ from the sovereigns, international 
law as a presumption will then cease to be in existence. In 
Martin’s translation, this crucial position of ‘usu’ for the law of 
nations is eliminated. He uses ‘公法出於常例，若明言不從此
常例，則例不復為常例也 ’ to translate van Bynkershoek’s 
words.48 This ambiguous statement literally reads as ‘public law 
originates from general practices (precedent), if (someone) 
clearly states not following this general practice (while dealing 
with a specific case), then this particular case will no longer be 
considered as (part of the) precedent.’  
In Wheaton’s translation, ‘gongfa (公法)’ is almost like 
the divine law. Its existence is completely irrelevant to the 
general practice of all the sovereigns and nations. Martin’s 
translation treats ‘changli’ (general practice) as the foundation 
of ‘gongfa’. If a case deviates from the general practice, then it 
will be disqualified as a general practice. This contradicts van 
Bynkershoek. Wheaton also quotes August Wilhelm Heffter’s 
theory and the related discussions. As Heffter argues, the words 
‘international law’ (droit international) cannot truly express the 
idea of ‘jus gentium’ (law of nations) proposed by Roman 
jurisconsults. 49  In Martin’s translation, the term droit 
international is translated as ‘zhuguo zhifa’ (law from all 
nations), while the term ‘gongfa’ is used to translate jus 
gentium. 50  According to Heffter’s explanation, jus gentium 
‘consists of two distinct branches’; first, it suggests ‘human 
rights in general’ 51  and, second, it refers to direct relations 
between states.52  
Wheaton notices the latter connotation is largely received 
by the world as the denomination of international law, which, as 
he sees, shall be called ‘external public law’. In Martin’s 
                                                          
48 WGGF, 5. 
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translation, ‘external public law’ is translated as ‘外公法 wai 
gongfa’, while its corresponding concept, ‘internal public law’, 
is referred to as ‘私權公法  siquan gongfa’. By doing this, 
Martin gave the term ‘gongfa’ a universal nature, which is not 
only applicable to international conduct, but also to individual 
interaction.  
Martin’s intention to establish modern international law as 
an example of Christian universality can also be found in other 
places in his translation. By analysing the works of Wolf, 
Puffendorf, and Grotius, Wheaton argues international law can 
only have legal binding force when nations are willing to be 
bound by it. ‘Law of nations’ is the ‘natural law of individuals 
applied to regulate the conduct of … states’. To the states, ‘they 
are not less bound to submit to the law which flows from it than 
they are bound to submit to the natural law itself’. The practice, 
or custom, still functions as the source of sanction in 
international law. The custom will be included ‘so far as it does 
not conflict with the natural law’. In this sense, natural law is 
not the sole origin of modern international law, but it provides a 
moral foundation for recognising the legitimacy of these 
practices, which in the eyes of positivism should be the source 
of international law. Therefore, even to Grotius, ‘voluntary Law 
of Nations’ is a more appropriate term.53 Martin’s translation of 
this section has an intriguing twist. According to the Chinese 
version, international law is slightly different from natural law 
principles because of the need to meet the general interests of all 
the nations.54 However, all the nations should follow this rule 
just like they have to follow the principles of their common law. 
If this principle does not conflict with the natural law, it should 
be adopted by all nations as a common practice, which Grotius 
describes as ‘the law that all the nations obey’. Similar to his 
approach in interpreting van Bynkershoek’s argument, Martin 
disguises Wheaton’s attempt to discover positivism in the 
natural law tradition. Martin uses ‘xingfa’ to translate 
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exclusively the concept of ‘natural law’, yet uses ‘lifa (理法)’ to 
interpret ‘common law’ and ‘natural law’ interchangeably. He 
also distorts the idea of law of nations being a ‘voluntary’ law 
by translating Grotius’s idea of ‘voluntary law of nations’ into 
‘the law that all the nations obey’.  
Martin’s attempt to describe 19th-century international law 
as a Christian knowledge that expresses the universality 
generally applicable to everyone is reflected in many of his 
other translations of international law writings. He reads 
international law as natural law extended to nations. He says 
‘gongfa’ is ‘xingfa’. 55  To Martin, natural law is almost 
equivalent to divine law. In the translation of Woolsey’s 
Introduction to the Study of International Law, Martin added the 
same atlas of two hemispheres as the one in WGGF. To Martin, 
it shows the unity of people as well as the divine rule of 
heaven. 56  A similar attitude can be found in John Fryer’s 
translations of international law writings. In Fryer’s translation 
of Edmund Robertson’s definition of ‘international law’, Fryer 
makes the expression sound like international law is a natural 
regulation that is followed by all civilised nations.57 Like Martin, 
Fryer treats international law as a given rule that precedes 
national practice. Therefore, it is important to recognise such a 
rule in order to be considered civilised.  
4.  ‘Chunqiu Gongfa’: A Chinese Perspective  
With the translation of international law, and with the 
expansion of Western legal and political education in China, 
Chinese intellectuals began to notice two interconnected issues; 
first, the necessity of transforming the imperial vassal into the 
modern citizen as a crucial base for modern Chinese nation 
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building; and second, to introduce and study the concept of 
‘gongfa’,  to provide a sense of equality and universal regulation 
for both domestic and international politics. Some scholars 
consider the term ‘gongfa’ to be the Chinese equivalent of 
international law. However, ‘gongfa’ in Martin and Fryer’s  
translations appears to be a divine law concept. Logically, it 
should be closer to the idea of the ‘law of nations’ rather than 
‘international law’. The previous term is widely used in natural 
law tradition, while the latter is used in the legal positivism 
tradition. Writings by China’s early reformists, including Zheng 
Guanying and Kang Youwei, appear to be closer to the 
missionaries’ interpretation of ‘gongfa’.  
The Chinese translation of EIL has an intriguing title: 
Wanguo Gongfa. ‘Wanguo’ literally means ten thousand 
countries. To Martin, the fall of the Zhou Dynasty unveiled the 
inception of national boundaries in China. The feudal lords were 
the European equivalent of nations that planted the need to 
introduce rules to regulate conflicts between states.58 Unlike the 
Chinese concept of ‘tianxia’, ‘wanguo’ assumes an equal world 
order with clear national distinction. ‘Gong’ not only implies the 
existence of an abstract and great good, it also suggests an idea 
of general agreement that defines the word ‘fa’ (regulations and 
rules). ‘Gongfa’, in this sense, is not just a regulation accepted 
by individual subjects that enjoy an absolute equality among 
themselves, it is also a law that functions on the highest level 
and serves the greater good among its subjects. The concept of 
‘gongfa’ generally forms a system, on which more Chinese 
concepts, such as ‘ren’, ‘min’ and ‘guo’, interact in the context 
of Western expansion and nation building.  
To the Qing officials, Chinese law was also based on 
universal principles, which also applied to foreigners. Prince 
Gong once argued the Qing government’s law had been 
translated into foreign languages, yet China did not compel 
foreigners to obey it, so how could foreigners impose their legal 
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regulations (the international law) on Chinese?59 To Yixin, the 
translation of foreign legal documents merely provided a 
necessary convenience for Chinese officials who conducted 
negotiations with foreign countries. 60  Although many Qing 
officers shared general unease about applying international law, 
some agreed it was a benefit to use Western legal concepts in 
international interactions, and to resolve international disputes.61 
Under Confucius’ universalism, many Qing officials had a 
positivistic understanding of European international law.  
As early as 1848, Xu Jiyu, then-governor of Fujian 
province, began to think of European international relations as 
being similar to China’s situation during the Warring States 
period. The decay of a unified empire led to the emergence of 
the contesting of small states.62  
A similar analogy appeared in Feng Guifen’s works. Feng 
was a major figure in the Qing Self-strengthening movement. 
He believed the realpolitik among European nations was similar 
to events during the Spring and Autumn Warring States period. 
The power struggles and betrayals were disguised in the 
language of moral principles and good faith.63 Such a correlation 
was further developed in the forward of WGGF, written by 
Zhang Sigui, a political advisor to Zeng Guofan and later a 
Chinese diplomat to Japan. Instead of calling this book Wanguo 
Gongfa, Zhang titled it Wanguo Lüli.64 As previously explained, 
the terms ‘lü’ and ‘li’ suggest legal codes and precedents, while 
‘fa’ is the guiding universal principle. Martin might not have 
noticed this subtle difference, but he did appreciate the analogy 
that compared Chinese principalities’ relations in the Spring and 
Autumn period with European international relations.65  
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In 1883, Martin published an article in The International 
Review. In that article, he explained that a system of guiding 
principles, recorded in Confucius’ canons, and which regulated 
interstate conduct, functioned as China’s ancient international 
law.66 He acknowledged the general code among those Chinese 
states during that period should be considered jus gentium.  
Martin’s reading of Chunqiu Gongfa served his ambition 
of establishing the analogy between Confucius’ moral principles 
and Christian norms. 67  However, to Chinese Confucian 
intellectuals, Chunqiu Gongfa had the potential to provide a 
guiding principle to explain the expanded world picture, which 
included Europe and America. During the mid-1870s, Zheng 
Guanying stated, in his ‘Lun Gongfa’ (On Public Law),68 it was 
important for China to understand the similarities and 
differences between Chinese and international laws, to conduct 
international interactions. Zheng believed Martin’s Chinese 
translation of Wheaton’s EIL was a good resource. Based on the 
same analogy, Zheng argued gongfa was based on the principles 
of ‘tianli’ and ‘renqing’. Hence, by obeying ‘gongfa’, states 
could operate in an environment that was beneficial to both the 
prosperity and morality of the people.69  
Chinese intellectuals’ attitudes toward ‘gongfa’ seemed to 
be ambiguous. On the one hand, they realised gongfa’s alien 
legal and political connotations; yet, on the other hand, they also 
intended to integrate gongfa into China’s world view, under the 
belief of ‘Chinese corpus and Western application’, or into a 
utopian view of world harmony. Zheng Guanying’s ‘Gongfa’ 
(Public Law, 1881) systematically connected the use of 
international law with domestic politics. Despite having been 
published in 1881, the article was composed in the 1860s when 
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Zheng worked as a comprador for Dent & Co. in Shanghai. 
During that period, many international law writings were 
translated and used as guidelines for international activities, 
especially commercial, in China. To Zheng, it was essential to 
have a common ground for daily international commercial 
practices. Zheng stated that ‘gongfa’ had existed in China since 
the Zhou Dynasty. It was a grand treaty generally agreed by all 
nations under tianxia. However, the idea of tianxia did not 
imply the merging of all nations into one, but the formation of a 
bloc that acknowledged national sovereignty.  
Gongfa must be based on a generally accepted rule. In 
Zheng’s interpretation, the divine authority from tianzi (literally 
the Son of Heaven) is such a rule. It sits above the national 
interests and rules over tianxia with benevolence and just by 
recognising the difference among nations. Although the 
structural relationship between general authority and 
sovereignty may change over time, and the actors (i.e. the nation 
or the feudal state) may be different as well, the principle of 
having a general rule remains immutable. Zheng’s gongfa idea 
addresses two aspects of jus gentium, and those are the aspects 
of the internal and the external public laws contained in Martin’s 
translation of Wheaton’s international  
Instead of seeing gongfa as a rule that unconditionally 
provides asylum equally for all nations, Zheng points out that 
national sovereignty is the condition for acquiring the rights 
stipulated by jus gentium. Therefore, self-strengthening (ziqiang) 
becomes the key issue for China. As expressed in his article 
‘Ziqiang Lun’ (on Self-strengthening), Zheng quotes a 
Portuguese diplomat, who said China can only resist foreign 
repression if its own people unify.70 The issue of modernising 
the people becomes the foundation for transforming China into 
an equal legal party in the practice of international law.  
Steering away from Martin’s idealistic vision, Chinese 
reformists viewed the principles of international conduct as 
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arising from realpolitik. Chen Chi approaches the issue of 
Chunqiu Gongfa through the power struggles of states. Chunqiu 
Gongfa emerged when the most powerful prince took the Zhou 
emperor hostage and issued orders to others in the name of 
benevolence of the emperor. 
Despite the unjust nature of warfare in Chunqiu period, the 
world did benefit from this action of peacemaking. Chen accepts 
that ‘gongfa’ emerged from Europe. He believed the 19th-
century European power struggle was no different than what 
China experienced during the Spring and Autumn period. 
Therefore, ‘gongfa’ should be considered a universal principle 
that can be applied by, and to, China. He explains there are two 
bases for law of nations, namely ‘de (德)’ and ‘li (力)’. The first 
is to ensure the justice of the principle, while the second is the 
condition necessary for all nations to obey the principle. 71 
Unlike Martin’s translation, Chen’s understanding of the law of 
nations is close to the positivist argument in the 19th-century 
Euro-American world.  
The diplomats of China in the late 19th century also held a 
more realistic attitude toward international law. Officials serving 
as front line diplomats were aware of the colonial nature in the 
19th-century practice of international law. In 1892, during his 
mission to Europe, Xue Fucheng continued to interpret 
contemporary European international relations through his 
knowledge of China’s Spring and Autumn period. He noticed 
that China’s then-focus on cultural development, rather than 
military strength, left China in a disadvantaged position. That 
was similar to the mistake made by the Zhou emperor during the 
Spring and Autumn period.72 Xue thought it was dangerous for 
China to be excluded from the principles of international law. 
He argued although international politics was mainly a power 
balance, the existence of international law as a generally 
accepted principle helped maintain peace in Europe.  
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Xue’s understanding of universality is reflected in his 
support of ‘bianfa’. To Xue, ‘fa’ indicates the actual skills used 
for governance, which he refers to as ‘zhishi fa’ (治世法). He 
believes as the fundamental principle of ‘fa’ is universal, China 
could ‘bianfa’ by following the skills and practices of the West. 
Regardless the difference of language and custom between 
China and foreign nations, their (law making endeavour) are 
both inspired by the spirit of nature and serving to benefit the 
wellbeing of the people.73 
Zeng Jize holds a similar opinion. Zeng believed Western 
international law originated from the penal code.74 Using it to 
regulate cases that involved foreigners was suitable under the 
Qing government’s legal system. Although the concept of 
‘gongfa’ is foreign, its spirit is universal. As Chinese law, 
‘gongfa’ is also based upon ‘qingli (情理 )’. This argument 
corresponds with the general principles of Chinese 
jurisprudence, which emphasises ‘tianli’ and ‘renqing’. Zeng 
believed compared with Western practice, the Chinese way of 
interacting with ‘weak and small countries’ best reflected the 
principle of ‘qingli’.75 
Some Chinese intellectuals have shown more theoretical 
interest than those front-line diplomats. In Shili Gongfa 
Quanshu (Book of Substantial Truths and Universal 
Principles),76 Kang Youwei sees ‘ren’ (仁, benevolence) as the 
subject of civil rights. The idea of ‘ren’ in this writing stands as 
a measure of social order. To Kang, ‘ren’ is the basis of the law. 
Law made by mankind should serve the fundamental principle 
of safeguarding the equality of humanity.77 
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Kang’s writings between 1878 and 1884 were heavily 
influenced by ‘Western books’ and Confucian texts. Those 
writings became, in large part, the foundation of his later 
utopian thoughts on ‘the Great Community’ (datong). In Kang’s 
theory, neither Chinese tradition nor Western knowledge is 
perfect. Only by discovering a ‘universalising formula’ can the 
great unity of the world be achieved. 78  However, under the 
influence of the reasoning power he observed in Western 
science and logical writings, Kang attempts to scientifically 
define the idea of truth. Revealed in Kang’s definition for the 
idea of ‘實 shi’ (substantiality), it appears that Kang uses this 
word in the sense of Logos. It is an ultimate rule that governs 
both the law of nature (Kang calls it ‘jihe gongli zhi fa’, which 
translates to the law of geometry axiom) and the law of man 
(renli zhi fa). Kang states the law of nature, such as geometry 
axiom, is a form of ‘實理 shili’ (substantial truth), which enjoys 
the ‘eternal substantiality’ (yongyuan zhi shi). Another form of 
substantial truth, ‘amphibious substantiality’ (liangke zhi shi), is 
changeable with human practice. The law of man (literally law 
set up by man) belongs in this category. Even though the law of 
man is not as substantial as the geometric axiom, Kang believes 
it still creates a substantial impact on human society, and that it 
also shapes people’s daily lives. The consequence of such an 
impact reveals the substantiality within the value of law, which 
can be used as an objective criterion to judge the quality of the 
law. Therefore, people should apply the law that is for the 
greater good of the public as a ‘gongfa’. 79  The connection 
between ‘shili’ and ‘gongfa’ forms a system that can be used to 
evaluate the principles and rules for achieving the utopian 
society. 
Although most scholars see Kang’s writing on the great 
unity as a utopian vision with a moral philosophical concern, in 
fact, his vision has a strong legal foundation, which Kang 
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acquired while reading books and periodicals, such as A Review 
of the Times. 80  As a prototype of his utopian vision, Kang 
attempts to understand the world (in his word, ‘tianxia’) through 
two categories, namely ‘Yili’ (justice) and ‘zhidu’ (rule). 81 
However, to Kang, the word ‘yili’ may have a more 
sophisticated meaning. Kang envisions yili as substantial truth, 
while zhidu contains laws created by human beings. Kang 
believes, to produce laws that are to people’s benefit, it is 
important to understand the truth of justice. Such a structuralised 
depiction of tianxia demonstrates impacts from the 19th-century 
development of Western knowledge based on the recognition of 
nation states. Kang’s vision of ‘gongfa’ is based on a detailed 
examination of the laws imposed by ‘nations on all the five 
continents’. As revealed in his appendix, WGGF, legal 
documents from all other countries and dictionaries of various 
languages can be used as resources for understanding and 
elaborating on the idea of ‘gongfa’. 82  Even with a strong 
influence from Western knowledge, Kang’s Utopia remained 
under his general acknowledgement of the tianxia world order.83  
With the ambition of constituting a ‘tianli’ based on the 
acknowledgment of Confucius’ universalism, Chinese Chunqiu 
Gongfa discussions should be understood outside the general 
framework of impact/reaction. As those Chinese reformist 
intellectuals realise, the effort to maintain the heavenly 
principles will be useless if they are not supported by power. 
The petition for political reform is legitimised by such a legal 
discussion. During the 19th-century power struggle, the Qing 
Dynasty was certainly on the losing end. The political reform, 
and later the revolution, called for a more-thorough 
transformation. Foreign-trained intellectuals, such as Shen 
Jiaben, Tang Yueliang and Cao Rulin, became the dominating 
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force during the late Qing and early republican governments. 
The legal and political discussions, therefore, began to focus 
less on the traditional concern of constituting Confucian ideas as 
the foundation of universality. Instead, a more Westernised 
discourse began to prevail in the Chinese political sphere.  
5. Conclusion  
To traditional Confucian scholars and officials, ‘tianxia’ 
does not necessarily mark the physical boundary of China as the 
‘Middle Kingdom’. It is an ontological category that develops 
with the expanding geographic understanding of the world. 
Confucianism provides an epistemological foundation for 
understanding and regulating the orders within ‘tianxia’. By 
looking back at the 19th century, we can see the attempts to 
interpret modern Western international law through this 
epistemology. We can also see, however, the growing doubts 
among intellectuals toward the universality of Confucianism. 
The Qing Dynasty established its first embassy in England in 
1876. Guo Songtao, as the first envoy to England, began to 
follow the Western code of international conduct, which 
generated a serious controversy among his peers back in China. 
However, to the Confucian officials who were on the front lines 
of foreign interactions, acknowledging the significance of 
modern international law was rather a practical choice in order 
to preserve the continuity of the Chinese empire.  
Nineteenth century Chinese Confucian intellectuals were 
capable of providing practical solutions that dealt with Western 
power without jeopardising the universality of Confucianism. 
However, in 1896, after a particularly disgraceful military defeat 
at the hands of Japan, China began to send students abroad to 
seek Western-style education. A large number of the students 
earned degrees in law and politics. With the growing number of 
foreign-educated young intellectuals, the epistemological 
foundation of a ‘tianxia’ world view was generally replaced by a 
Western one. By 1905, the Qing government had abolished the 
imperial exam, which had been used to select officials since the 
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seventh century in China. The policy uprooted Confucianism as 
the guiding knowledge of governance. The practice of using 
Confucius’ concepts to interpret Western terminologies was 
gradually replaced by the use of Western knowledge to 
comprehend Chinese society, as well as her position in the 
modern global order of ‘family of nations’. In 1911, just six 
years after this drastic political reform, a political revolution 
overthrew the Qing government and transformed China into a 
republic. That began a new era for China in its continuous 
search for its position in the dynamic of the world order.  
 
 
